{"id":16,"date":"2026-07-19T21:56:22","date_gmt":"2026-07-20T01:56:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nscoesn.ca\/sovereignty\/"},"modified":"2026-07-19T22:01:12","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T02:01:12","slug":"sovereignty","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/nscoesn.ca\/en\/sovereignty\/","title":{"rendered":"Sovereignty"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Sovereignty is a foundational principle of international law: the supreme and exclusive authority of a state over its territory<\/mark>. It carries a matching obligation on every other state to respect that authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the canonical statement, see the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928, in which Max Huber described sovereignty as the right to exercise the functions of a state to the exclusion of all others.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The open question is how this principle holds when territory, data, and jurisdiction no longer coincide. The Centre’s work engages three positions, each more precise than the last.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Technological sovereignty<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

UN GGE, 2015<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Existing international law, including the UN Charter, applies to state conduct in cyberspace. The 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts confirmed that states have jurisdiction over the ICT infrastructure within their territory. Authority still follows physical location.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Digital sovereignty<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

France and the EU, 2014 to 2018<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

An extension addressing state authority over data as it moves within and across borders, and over the platforms that carry it. First articulated in France in 2014, it gained force through the EU General Data Protection Regulation in 2018. The model is still territorial: the concern is data and platforms operating inside state borders.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Data sovereignty<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Proposed framework, lex ferenda<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

A proposed extension addressing state authority over data regardless of where it physically resides. It holds that a state retains, or ought to retain, the exclusive right to control access to its data even when that data has been replicated to infrastructure in another jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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This position was necessitated by the extraterritorial reach of legislation such as the United States CLOUD Act, which can oblige a US-registered provider to produce data on lawful demand wherever that data is stored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scenario: jurisdiction over data<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The following scenario is illustrative and uses the neutral form common to international law case examples. States B and C are not identified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. A government department in State A procures cloud services from a commercial service provider headquartered in State B.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. In the ordinary course of that service, the provider replicates a portion of the data to other data centres under its control, located in State B. Consider then, in the alternative:\n
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    1. State B authorises its law enforcement agencies to access data held by providers registered in State B, and obliges those providers to preserve and disclose that data on production of a warrant. State B may compel disclosure of the data of State A without reference to the consent or legal framework of State A;<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. the data held in the State B data centre is breached by foreign non-state actors and copied to data centres located in State C. The non-state actors then publicly release the material drawn from the State C data centres; or<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. State B concludes an executive-level agreement with a further state, State D, permitting State D to make direct demands on providers headquartered in State B. State D may then compel production of the data of State A, including data held in State A, from the State B provider or from its subsidiary in State A, and neither the provider nor State D is obliged to notify State A.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Neither technological nor digital sovereignty offers a remedy, because neither reaches data that has moved beyond the originating state. Data sovereignty, as lex ferenda, proposes that the law must follow the data rather than the infrastructure. It awaits adoption by a state to begin its passage toward customary international law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      Research<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

      The Centre draws on the following peer-reviewed research to establish and recognise data sovereignty as an emerging norm of international law, lex ferenda, the law as it ought to become.<\/p>\n\n\n\n